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Abstract
A new explanation for the well-known reluctance of retirees to buy life annuities is due to
Milevsky and Young (2002, 2003): Since the decision to purchase longevity insurance is largely
irreversible, in uncertain environments a real option to delay annuitization (RODA) generally
has value. Milevsky and Young analytically identify and numerically estimate the RODA in a
setting of constant relative risk aversion. This paper presents an extension to the case oflIA.RA
(or GLUM) preferences, the simplest representation of a consumption habit. The precise date
of annuitization can no longer be ascertained with certainty in advance. This paper derives an
approximation whereby the agent precommits. The effect of increasing the subsistence con-
sumption rate on the timing of annuity purchase is similar to the effect of increasing the
curvature parameter of the utility function. As in the CRRA case studied by Milevsky and
Young, delayed annuitization is associated with optimistic predictions of the Sharpe ratio and
divergence between annuity purchaser and provider predictions of mortality.
1 Introduction
One of the most important financial decisions many people make is the choice of a
portfolio of assets during retirement. One difficult decision concerns longevity risk,
where individuals face the possibility of outliving their resources or, alternatively, of
foregoing consumption by dying before wealth is exhausted. Economic theory has
long maintained that the protection against longevity risk offered by annuities is
valuable and should therefore be a sought-after product (Yaari, 1965; Davidoff,
Brown, and Diamond, 2003). But, despite the ready availability of longevity In-
surance, retirees across the world seldom voluntarily annuitize.
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Milevsky and Young (2002, 2003) have come up with a new explanation for the
reluctance of retirees to buy life annuities. They begin with the observation that re-
negotiable annuity contracts are not available in general, so that the decision to
purchase longevity insurance is largely irreversible. The literature on real options
demonstrates that in an uncertain environment it often pays to delay investments that
cannot easily be reversed. Using a Merton (1969) continuous-time model under
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), together with Ibbotson Associates financial
data and North American mortality data, Milevsky and Young find that it is gen-
erally better to delay buying a fixed life annuity until age 70. The intuition is straight-
forward: a longer period of exposure to the risky asset prior to annuitization offers
people a chance to improve their budget constraint that evaporates after annui-
tization. So even risk averse individuals may decide to delay in the expectation of
creating more wealth and enjoying a higher long-term income. Further, it has also
been generally thought that people will avoid buying annuities whenever their
personal evaluation of life expectancy is lower than average. But Milevsky and Young
demonstrate that this perception is too limited. They show that individuals who
expect to live longer than average may also delay annuitizing, anticipating that they will
survive to benefit from risky asset exposure and falling annuity premiums as they age.
Our aim is to extend and reassess their analysis for a more general description of
preferences. Hyperbolic absolute risk aversion, otherwise known as linear risk toler-
ance, was introduced to continuous-time modeling by Merton (1971). A one-par-
ameter special case can be obtained by setting the curvature parameter of the utility
function equal to one; that is, by defining one-period utility as the logarithm of
consumption plus a constant. This special case has long been known to micro-
economists as the Stone-Geary utility function, and has been described more recently
by financial economists as the generalized logarithmic utility model (GLUM)
(Rubinstein, 1976). The version of HARA preferences used in our set-up measures
utility over. consumption relative to a predetermined floor or subsistence level.
There are several reasons why the Milevsky- Young analysis is worth extending to
the HARA (or GLUM) case. First, a fixed consumption floor is the simplest possible
representation of a consumption habit, either external or internal. Insofar as the habit
paradigm constitutes a useful characterization of any phase of the life-cycle, surely
retirement is that phase. Second, the investor with CRRA preferences buys in falling
markets and sells in rising ones. Perold and Sharpe (1988) point out, however, that
only a buy-and-hold strategy is consistent with the behavior of the' average' investor
in equilibrium. Stone-Geary (or GLUM) preferences can capture buy-and-hold be-
havior! Third, HARA preferences can capture a taste for 'portfolio insurance',
whereby the investor seeks a convex payoff profile and implements this in part by
buying in rising markets and selling in falling ones.! Finally, HARA (or GLUM) may
be superior to CRRA when a financial planner is attempting to elicit information
about the risk tolerance of a retired client. In particular, the planner may find it easier
to phrase clarifying questions in terms of the client's minimum consumption
requirements than the usual questions about indifference between choices involving
hypothetical gambles.
Readers of Ingersoll's (1987) classic text will know that the key to solving problems
involving HARA utility is to transform the state variable for wealth so as to reduce
the problem to one of CRRA utility with a state variable net of an 'escrowed' wealth
component that protects the consumption floor. Two escrow funds are needed in the
present case, one to protect floor consumption prior to annuitization, and thc other
to protect floor consumption afterwards. We demonstrate that the presence of these
two escrow funds reduces the optimal delay period, bringing forward unnuitization
whenever the consumption floor is non-zero. In addition, numerical examples show
that moderately risk averse investors who wish to insure 50 per cent of their con-
sumption stream will optimally annuitize 5-6 years earlier than those who do not.
The analysis also shows that divergence between the annuitant's subjective judgement
of life expectancy and the annuity provider's objective judgement will increase the
optimal delay, as Milevsky and Young demonstrated, but the range of divergence is
more compressed whenever the consumption floor is non-zero.
The evidence on voluntary annuitization is reviewed in Section 2, with particular
reference to the Australian case. The theoretical derivation for the optimal timing of
annuitization for an individual with HARA preferences is set out in Section 3. Section
4 presents numeric illustrations and Section 5 concludes. Appendices A to D contain
algebraic derivations that are too long for the main text.
1 For evidence that the investment behaviour of the elderly shows buy-and-hold behavior, sec Ameriks and
Zeldes (200 I).
• Leland (1980) provides a two-period analysis of conditions on the value function that generate a demand
for portfolio insurance. Kingston (1989) discusses conditions under which HARA utility generates"
dem~nd for portfolio insurance of the' constant proportion' variety. Having closed off the option to
contmue workmg, retirees no longer hold embedded put options on stocks (Liu and Neiss, 2002) and
therefore can be considered more likely than workers to be buyers of portfolio insurance.
2 Voluntary annuitization patterns
Reluctance to buy life annuities is a worldwide phenomenon." The standard
explanations include: high actuarial loadings arising from adverse selection, the wish
to make bequests to heirs, alternative support from family members or from life
income streams provided by the government, the wish to self-insure against the
contingencies of expensive health care or nursing home care, high life-office margins
arising from incompleteness in either the maturity structure or the contingency
structure of government bonds on issue, and inadequate consumer education." Long
as this list is, it has not proved wholly convincing and the empirical puzzle persists.
Low levels of voluntary annuitization are becoming more evident as countries add
dcfined-contribution components to existing retirement savings schemes. In
Australia, for example, where all employees over the age of IK years contribute' a
mandatory percentage of their earnings to retirement sa vings, rio-one is compelled to
purchase longevity insurance at retirement. A means-tested government pension
provides a real annuity to qualifying people over 65 years of age. For other retirees,
an array of tax-preferred income stream choices are on offer. These include immedi-
ate fixed annuities (life and term), immediate variable term annuities (' term allocated
3 Milevsky and Young (2002) provide relevant statistics for the US case.
4 Mitchell and McCarthy (2002) provide a detailed account or these issues.
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Pcnstons and Annuities
Eligible Terruinanon Payment Sales
1999-2002
Sales of allocated pensions dominate sales of all fixed annuity types since 1989.
Even when one considers immediate annuities separately, sales of lifetime products
(very small to begin with) have continued to decline in favour of term annuities,
particularly those which return residual capital. The insurance implicit in social se-
curity payments may account for at least some of this disparity, along with the impact
of loadings and adverse selection.
2000
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3 Options to delay annuitization
Predictions from life-cycle theories depend on assumptions about agents' preferences
for consumption and risk. The CRRA model assumes that agents derive satisfaction
from the absolute level of their consumption. Rubinstein (1976) and others advocated
the alternative view that utility from consumption was better measured relative to
some reference level. In other words, utility increases only as consumption rises above
a floor or subsistence. More recently, the habit formation literature (see
Constantinides (1990) and Campbell and Cochrane (1999) for example) has gen-
eralized the idea of relative utility by allowing the consumption floor to vary over
time according to an internal or external habit.
A generalized utility (HARA) model also meshes more naturally with the pensions
policy debate. Consider the way people plan for retirement. The most common metric
for the adequacy of an accumulation is the long-term income stream it can generate.
Pension calculators frame retirement provision in terms of' required gross income in
today's dollars'. This question aims to identify the minimum consumption stream a
person can adequately subsist on, which is also the basic idea behind discussion of
replacement rates. To describe such a preference for subsistence consumption one
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Figure 1. Australian sales of retirement income streams
Source: Plan For Life (2003).
pensions '), and phased withdra wal products (' allocated pensions '). Just as in other
parts of the developed world. life annuities are not a popular choice in Australia. In
2002 Australians held assets of$II.6 billion in the form of life annuities (IFSA, 2002).
Compared to the $34 billion invested in allocated pensions, this was a modest
amount." .
Australian regulators have tried unsuccessfully to motivate annuity purchases."
When an individual allocates a t least half of their retirement savings to a life or life-
expectancy annuity with no residual capital value, they are allowed a higher tax-
concessional income. and the value of the annuity is also treated concessionally in
social security means tests. Despite this, Figure I below shows that people have sel-
dom purchased life annuities. Instead, most retirement savings are held in allocated
pension accounts, which have regulated withdrawal limits, but offer no risk pooling.
In addition, the average allocated pension account maintains a 60 per cent exposure
to risky asset classes - stocks and commercial real estate - suggesting that the pros-
pect of better returns is an important factor in retirees' choices. The prospect of
higher returns, combined with ongoing control over one's own portfolio has evidently
been appealing.
3.1 After annuitization
Annuitization at time T is taken to mean that a retiree aged x+ Tplaces all her assets
in a real life annuity." Following Milevsky and Young [M-Y] we assume for sim-
plicity that that the real interest rate r is equal to the rate of time preference.
Combined with the assumed absence of risky assets in the life annuity, a consequence
is that consumption after annuitization is level. The subjective hazard rate after
annuitization is denoted by A~+ T+ I (I? 0). The corresponding subjective annuity
factor for an agent aged x+ T is a~+T' The objective hazard rate after annuitization
is A~+ T+ I and the corresponding objective probability of survival is tP~+ T' In the
case of time-separable HARA preferences, discounted direct utility at time t after
annuitization is
5 Moreover, few of these would have involved purchased products. as distinct from non-marketed
entitlements from defined-benefit pension plans. (See Figure 1.)
e Australian regulators have recently introduced market-linked income stream prod~cts called' tc.nn
allocated pensions'. Their aim is to offer a non-commutable, variable i~lcom~ stream WIth a t~~m ofhfe:
expectancy, but without the restricted r~rttoho. base of conventional fixed life or term nrmumes. There
appears to be \10 longevity-risk pooling teuture 1I1 these products
(
x+T+' )(Ct-C/-Y.- rt+ J X:.dl'
U(e, I; T)= --- e x+T
I-y
(1)
7 It appears that the only deep market anywhere in the world for variable (with-profit) life annuities is
within the TIAA-CREF pension plan in the United Stales (see Milevsky and Young).
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so that the corresponding equation for indirect utility is subject to
(;z--C\ l-y _ (rl+ "'+JH A:dV)
"'+T ) e "'+T (2)
l-y ,
where the actuarial present value of a life annuity paying one dollar per year is
dW, =[rW1 +(a -r)nl - CMt +an,dz"
where E denotes the expectations operator, and dz, is a Wiener increment.
[(
W .)l-Y]..!!:.L-C
_ -rT s - ~+T
V(W,O,n=e TPx«x+TE l-y . (4)
3.3 Solution
Optimal stopping problems comparable with the one here are analyzed by Karatzas
and Wang (2000). They find that it is difficult to characterize the solution to problems
for which the optimal stopping time changes stochastically with the evolution of the
state variable, i.e. wealth. In contrast to the problem solved by Milevsky and Young,
the problem studied here has this complication. It remains under the duality ap-
proach recommended by Karatzas and Wang, as distinct from the HJB equation of
dynamic programming utilized by Milevsky and Young (and by the present paper).
For tractability we require that the retiree chooses an optimal annuitization time at
time zero. Put another way, we disregard the' American put' feature of our problem.
Analysis of this feature is left to future research.
This paper characterizes a precommitment to T on the basis of information avail-
able at any prior time, t. This first-order condition has the desirable property of
reducing to the first-order condition derived by Milevsky and Young in the case of
constant relative risk aversion, in other words, a zero consumption floor.
Consider a retiree who makes a pre-commitment to annuitize at a future date, T.
Once a pre-commitment is made, we can construct a value function that treats the
annuitization date T as given, and measures remaining utility at time I, from time 1
rather than from time zero, mapping into M-Y (2003, equation (8»,
V(W, I; n =" sup E [fT e-r(V-t)(,'_IP~+I) (~v -c/-Y dv
c..n, -y
I
(J!L_C)l-Y ]+e-r(T-t) pS as ~+T IWt= w, c~o. T-t x+I x+T l-y (7)






and a~+T is the market annuity factor for an individual aged x +T.
Seen from" time zero the individual's value function at any given future time Tis
therefore given by
Equation (4) implies a boundary condition V(W, T, n[= ~+T(C-Cr-/l-Y]
for the retiree's pre-annuitization PDE.
3.2 The pre-annuitization problem
Prior to annuitization (0"; 1<n, the retiree holds her wealth in a portfolio invested
partly in shares with instantaneous expected return a and variance cr, and partly in
indexed bonds with known return r.
The risky asset process is described by a conventional geometric Brownian motion
dS(I) =as(I)dt +as(t)dz,
where dz, is a standard Wiener process. In the numerical analysis below values for a
and a are set by reference to long-term forecasts of the real equity premium and
observed values of equity market volatility. The indexed bond return is assumed to
follow
dB(t)=rB(t)dt.
where E denotes expectations. The difference between this problem and its counter-
part M-Y (2003) is the presence here of a consumption floor. The two problems
can be linked by a suitable transformation of the state variable. Specifically, define
'surplus' wealth W as the difference between actual wealth Wand 'floor' or
'escrowed' wealth W, defined by
w= ~(l-er(t-7)+CiiO er(/-7)- r x+T'
W="W-W. (8)
At time zero the retiree's problem is to make contingent plans for the amount n,
invested in stocks, along with consumption C" and a date T on which the retiree's
wealth is annuitized
[
T • l-y ]




The first term on the right-hand side of equation (8) can be interpreted as a fund that
protects floor consumption prior to annuitization. Likewise, the second term can be
interpreted as a fund that protects floor consumption after annuitization. Define
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•surplus' consumption as C == C - C.We can now write the following HJB equation
in Wand other variables, corresponding to equation (9) of M-Y (2003)
(r+A~+t)V= V,+ nwx [4a2IIZVww + (a-r)IIVwl +rWVw
[ c--r]+max -CVw+-I-,c;;,o ~y (9)
=rC§(t)W-r { W - [~(1_er(t-1))+ ca~+Ter(I-1)] }
UJ-ry-1






~ _ UJ-y I J'.=! ~ -




with the boundary condition
(
~ ) 1-'1'1 WT _,
V(W,T; 1')=~::o- ax+T'
I' ax+T




c*=c+(Vwfr (11) (r+A~+I)C§(t) ra() C§'(t) .1' [@( )]'1'-1 (a-r)Z /~( )-'----::"'--'-'---= r;;1t + -- + -- ;of t 'I' + -- '-9 t .
1-1' 1-1' 1-1' 2aZy
(19)
and
II*= _ (a-r) Vw , (H)
aZ Vww
and substitute (11) and (12) into equation (9). The result is a PDE to be solved for an
explicit expression for V(W, t; 1')
s I' -1/'1' ' 1 (a_r)z (Vw)z
(r+Ax+t)V=V,+-I-0'w +(rW-C)Vw--2--Z--V . (13)-I' a ww
We propose a solution to the PDE in (13) in the form
Rearranging equation (19) gives an ODE in ~/j(t)
[
J'.=!]O=C§'(t)+y -g(t)0(t)+ [C§(t)] 'I' , (20)
where get) == !.?tr~~~i')- r - (~;;;;']. Appendix A presents a verification that the





a-s y r-o(l-Y)(T) 1x+T - -I s
C§(t)= {(a~+T)l 'I} e 'I' (T-IPx+Jy
T ]'1'r-O(l-y) 1- (v-I)· S -+!e 'I' C,-,PX+I)Y dv ,
V(W, t; 1')=C§(t)_I_(W- Wjl-y. (14)
1-1'
Recalling the definition of W from (8) and noting that W= W- W, allows us to write
the partial derivatives of V(W,T; 1') as
Vww= -yC§(t) W-y-1 (16)
~-'I' , (1)' (I 1) UJ-Y ( )
Vt=C§(t) W (Cerl- -rCa~+Ter - )+C§'(t) 1-1" 17
Substituting (14-17) into equation (13) gives
UJ-r UJ-Y
(r+A' +1)C§(t)-- =C§(t) W-Y (Cer(I-1) -rCa~+Ter(I-1)) +C§'(t)-l-
x 1-1' -I'
'I-I




and the solution to the PDE (13) is
V(W, t; 1')= _1_ UJ-Y [{ a~+T
1-1' (-0)'ax+T
T ]Yr-O(l-y) 1- (v-I) s-+!e Y (v-tPx+Jy dv (21)
, 1
where <5== r+(~;;:;;. The term in square brackets we define as z(t, T) == C§(t)Y.
For a pre-committed date of annuitization Tthe value function (21) coincides with
the' true' value function. Hence (21) can be differentiated to find the best approxi-
mate annuitization date. Appendix B shows that, if we calculate the derivative of
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!=.r
av = _1_ w-Y yz(t T)y-tl-y (ii".::+T) y e_r-d~-Y)(T_t) ( _ pS )~
aT 1 '-0 T I x+ t-y Y ax+T
x [_y (ii".::+T\-(t?) __ 1 + a~+T +as (o-(r-fio »]
l-y a~+T) l-y a~+T x+T x+T
_ (t T)Y W- -Y c -r(T-I),O -0
Z , e /\.x+Ta,x+T·
Table 1. Approximate optimal age at annuitization
Male (Female)





Zero insured consumption 0.5 77.3 (81.6) 87.7 (90.7)
50% insured consumption I 70.6 (75.7) 80.9 (84.6)
Curvature parameter, y = 1
Zero insured consumption 1 70.6 (75.7) 80.9 (84.6)
50% insured consumption 2 63.8 (69.9) 74.2 (78.8)
Curvature parameter, y=2
Zero insured consumption 2 63.8 (69.9) 74.2 (78.8)
50% insured consumption 4 57.0 (64.2) 67.4 (73.0)
Equation (22) differs from its counterpart in M-Y (16) by the additional term
which is negative, and therefore a factor bringing forward annuitization.
The intuition behind (22) is straightforward. The HARA retiree protects all future
subsistence consumption in escrow wealth, and consequently holds a smaller pro-
portion of total wealth in the equity portfolio than the CRRA agent with C=O.
Lower exposure to the potentially high-yielding risky asset therefore reduces the
option value of delaying annuitization. It follows that introducing a positive con-
sumption floor has a similar effect to raising relative risk aversion. In addition, the
agent recognizes that it is 'cheaper' to store escrow wealth in an annuity rather than a
bond portfolio (at least where there are small enough loadings), creating another
incentive to switch into complete annuitization at an earlier date.
Evaluating at 1= T and allowing subjective and objective survival probabilities to
coincide simplifies (22) to
(23)
One remarkable theoretical result of the Milevsky-Young model concerns the
importance of divergent perceptions of the force of mortality to the optimal
annuitization delay. In the HARA case, the additional weighting on the force of
mortality evident in the right-hand term of (24) brings forward annuitization relative
to the CRRA case, but the impact of divergent opinions on ilx+T is similar. The proof
outlined in Appendix D demonstrates that, whenever the individual thinks they are
less likely to survive so that ii".::+T< a~+T' or when the individual thinks they are
more healthy than average, in such a way that a~+T < ii".::+T<2a~+T' the optimal
time to annuitize will be later than the T given by (22), even for a positive con-
sumption floor. Howe~er the important caveat in the HARA case is that the presence
of stochastic wealth W in the optimality condition makes all such comparisons ap-
proximate prior to the actual annuitization date.
To illustrate these ideas, the next section compares optimal annuitization timing
for zero and insured consumption over a variety of risk tolerances and asset returns.
Setting this expression equal to zero, and using the fact that Cax+T = WT, shows
that the optimal annuitization date will be decided by
aVIS=O (TV )
aT =O~o-r=ilx+T l+~ .I=T WT
Notice firstly that under the M-Y assumption of no consumption floor (*=01, the
retiree's optimal stopping problem in the s=O case is a simple companson between
the risk-adjusted excess return to stocks and the return to annuities. Secondly, in-
clusion of a consumption floor brings the level of wealth into the solution to the
retiree's annuitization problem. This changes the nature of the solution, from being
deterministic to approximate. In the absence of a consumption floor the retiree
theoretically can know her date of annuitization decades in advance. In our case she
must make an expectation of future wealth when evaluating alternative annuitization
dates, and choose T according to (22) to maximize expected utility. Thirdly, a first-
order condition characterizing T in terms of information available at any prior time 1
(including 1=0) is derived in Appendix C.
(24)
4 Numeric implications
One way to assess the impact of consumption insurance on annuitization is to apply
observed mortality data and returns data to the model of Section 3. Once tastes for
risk and subsistence are fixed, the optimal time to annuitize from (24) depends on
comparison between the gains to risky asset exposure (here measured by <5and de-
termined by the Sharpe ratio), and the value of the force of mortality scaled up by
( 1+*). Table 1 below shows the effects of increasing insured consumption from 0
to 50 per cent of total consumption. Fixing the proportion of subsistence consump-
tion allows calculation of the relative risk aversion of the HARA agent, which, as
noted earlier, is not constant, but falls as consumption increases above the floor.
Recall also that the ratio * appears in the optimality condition. This fraction ap-
proaches unity (~= l) in the 50 per cent insured case at the point of annuitization.
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OptimalAgeatAnnuitization
Males,50%insuredconsumption,'Y=1
Table 2. Age at annuitization, divergent survival rates. optimistic Sharpe ratio
(Male)
Sharpe ratio =0.30
Curvature parameter y=0.5 y=1 y=2
Consumption floor 50% zero 50% zero 50% zero
factor!
-0.8 83.71 95.18 75.54 84.36 68.10 75.64
-0.6 82.21 90.76 74.77 82.37 67.88 74.80
-0.4 81.43 88.85 74.39 81.47 67.48 74.39
-0.2 81.04 87.97 74.20 81.05 67.39 74.20
0 80.92 87.71 74.15 80.93 67.37 74.15
0.2 81.04 87.95 74.19 81.03 67.39 74.19
0.5 81.59 89.33 74.41 81.54 67.48 74.41
1.0 83.86 75.14 83.44 67.78 75.10
1.5 86.06 76.35 87.88 68.21 76.20





75 +-------------="""""""oo:I!!!=~:.".-;.....•......•.... .:. .:. ..:: . --l
-=- 7605+-----:=;;;~::<::;=;;-....::.--=---=---_._._. -------Ja ~ .
b 60+----~~--""~~;:::..".,,;.:...------------__l





20 -H-T"T"" r-r-r r-T"""I"..,...,..T"T"" r-r-t r-T"""I"..,...,...,....,...T""T""rT""'T"'TT.,...,..T""T""rT""'T"'TT.,...,......,..,r-T"""I"...,...l
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30
Sharpe Ratio
0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50
I· ... Aust. Pop. -- IAM2000 -- Aust. Annuitantsl
Figure 2. Optimal age at annuitization as Sharpe ratio varies
The Sharpe ratios of 0.18 and 0.30 underlying Table 1 obtain for two alternative
forecasts of stock market returns, namely, a=0.06, r=0.03, and 0=0.17, roughly in
line with the views of Campbell (2002), or a=0.12, r=0.06, and 0=0.02, consistent
with M- Y and in line with the more optimistic views of Ibbotson (2002). Dispersion
and modal parameters of the Gompertz distribution were estimated over Australian
data" for males (females) at b=9.78(8.35) and m=88.95(92.76).
There are two key points to make here. Firstly, the combination of a conservative
forward-looking Sharpe ratio and a 50 per cent consumption floor causes any
advantage in delayed annuitization to vanish for males and to shrink to about five
years for females when y= 1. Delays are still preferred by the more risk tolerant. Not
so, however, if choices are guided by an optimistic 'historical' assumption for the
Sharpe ratio, linked to the high returns to equity that were recorded during the
twentieth century in the United States, Australia, and a handful of other. countries
(Jorion and Goetzmann, 1999). Following Milevsky and Young, and using the higher
Sharpe ratio raises the optimal delays to almost ten years for men and 14 years
for women. Secondly, optimistic estimates of survival probability will also delay
annuitization.
To gauge the importance of the Sharpe ratio and choice of mortality parameters to
the delay, consider Figure 2. Figure 2, graphs the optimal annuitization date for a
male agent with 50 per cent insured consumption across a range of Sharpe ratios and
setting y = 1. Only as the Sharpe ratio rises above 0.20 does any advantage emerge in
Note: A dash indicates that no stationary point of the value function existed in the range
permitted by the parameterization.
• TheGompertzfunctionis usedas a continuousapproximationto discretemortalitytables.Parameters
herewereestimatedas log(Px) = exp(T) (1- eXPi).Mortalitydata werefromAustralianLifeTables
95-97, usingimprovedmortalitydiscountedby 60%, to mimicthe longevityof self-selectingannuitants.
Improvementswerecalculatedusing the ABSmethod outlinedin the LifeTables.For discussionof
estimationmethodsgenerallyseeValdez(2000)andCarriere(1992).For discussionofAustralianpractice
in estimatingannuitiants'mortalityseeKnox (2000)and Doyle,Mitchelland Piggott(2002).
delaying annuitization. Divergence in mortality estimates may account for around a
4-5 year variation in the optimal delay.
One key feature of the Milevsky and Young (2003) model is the potential for
divergence between subjective and objective survival probabilities. Their extension of
the standard single-distribution set-up is motivated by recent empirical evidence that
subjective assessments of longevity have predictive power beyond the usual markers
for length of life (such as smoking, disease etc.), and that individuals will revise
subjective survival probabilities in response to new information (Hurd and McGarry,
2002). Including subjective views on mortality in models of annuitization can also
help clarify the discussion of adverse selection, which has long been flagged as a
reason for low rates of voluntary annuitization.
Results from the M- Y model show that when the decision to annuitize requires the
complete and final transfer of all wealth, any disagreement about survival prob-
abilities between the consumer and annuity provider motivates a delay: consumers in
poor health find the terms of the annuity contract unfavorable; healthy consumers
discount future consumption more slowly and hope for gains from longer exposure to
the stock market. The numerical examples reported below (following M- Y) use the
proportional hazards transformation to distinguish subjective and objective survival
probabilities, where A.~= (1+/)A.~. A positive value of/means that the individual is
less healthy than suggested by the objective standard, and negative values of/indicate
that the individual is more healthy, with -I </< 00.
Tables 2 and 3 present numerical estimates of the optimal time to annuitize for an
individual who at t = T insures 50 per cent of their consumption, compared with the
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(Male)
Sharpe ratio=0.18
Curvature parameter 1'=0.5 1'=1 1'=2
Consumption floor 50% zero 50% zero 50% zero
factor f
-0.8 73.98 85.43 65.70 74.64 58.03 65.82
-0.6 72.05 80.55 64.57 72.20 57.42 64.61
-0.4 71.12 78.51 64.07 71.15 57.14 64.07
-0.2 70.67 77.59 63.82 70.68 57.02 63.83
0 70.55 77.33 63.77 70.55 56.99 63.77
0.2 70.66 77.57 63.82 70.66 57.01 63.82
0.5 71.22 78.85 64.70 71.19 57.14 64.07
1.0 73.35 86.71 64.88 73.03 57.51 64.83
1.5 78.96 66.15 76.81 58.03 66.01
2.0 80.90 68.02 58.70 67.66
insurance, the simplest form of a habit persistence model, on the timing of optimal
annuitization.
Two results are worth noting. Firstly, the desire to keep consumption above a
specified floor creates an incentive to annuitize earlier than otherwise. HARA agents
must maintain an escrow fund in the risk-free asset to cover future subsistence,
effectively shrinking the potential for wealth creation through risky asset investment
compared with CRRA agents, and making actuarially fair annuities more attractive.
Secondly, divergence between a retiree's subjective assessment of their survival pros-
pects and the annuity provider's objective assessment of their prospects will still add
to any delay, as Milevsky and Young established.
Numerical estimates of the optimal annuitization date for a 65-year old male with a
50 per cent insured consumption floor depend on risk tolerance and forecasts of asset
returns. For a plausible range of parameters, there is no advantage in delay. Putting
off full annuitization will be better for females, for the more risk tolerant, for in-
dividuals who have optimistic expectation of investment returns, and for those who
do not agree with market mortality estimates.
Table 3. Age at annuitization, divergent survival rates, conservative Sharpe ratio
5 Conclusion
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M- Y propose a solution
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By showing that the derivative of function (A.5) with respect to t satisfies equation
(A.3), and showing that it meets the boundary condition (AA), we verify that it is a
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We can write, using Leibnitz's rule
Appendix A: Verification of ODE solution
Equation (20) is a Bernoulli ODE of the form
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(A.7)
with boundary condition
CfJ(1) = a~+T Y'
(a~+T)1
1
Define z(t, 1) == [CfJ(t)]Y and rewrite (A. I) as:
(A.2)
dz + [- gz + l]dt =0
that is,
dz
dt =g(t)z(t, 1)-1, (A.3)
with boundary condition
(AA)
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We note that z(t, T) has two additive terms. Consider the first term:
where
= g(t)z(t, T)- 1, (A.8)
which verifies equation (A.3).
Finally we note that as t --> T
(
«::+T )~ (A.9)z(t, T)-->z(T) = (-0 )1 l' ,
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boundary condition holds.
In addition
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-e)' =- e l' ,
aT y
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Appendix B: Derivation of equation (24)
Specify the value function
W1-)' W1-)'
V(W, t; T)=~(t)I_y =z(t, T)1' I-y (B.l) by Leibnitz's rule.
Together
{(
ii:'. )~ ~(T-I) .!
z(r, T))' == 0 x+i)' e- l' (T-IPx+I))'
(ax+T)
T }1'r-o(l-y) !- (V-I) .)'+!e)' (,.-IPX+I) dv
W, == £(1-er(I-1))+ta~+rer(I-1).
r
Differentiating this function with respect to T gives the optimal time to annuitize,
Using the product and chain rules,
a _r-O(I-Y)(T_t) .! 1 _r-o(l-Y)(T_I) !
aTe)' (T-tPx+I))' = ye)' (T-~+I))'
X [( -A~+T)-(r-o(1-Y))l.
(B.2) Then using the product rule again
(B.3)
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Now differentiate the second additive term in z(t, T) by Leibnitz's rule to get
T
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The sum of (B.5) and (B.6) shows that
8z(t, T) = (l-y) (~+T)T _r-o~-Y)(T_t) ( s)~
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Thus the first term in (B.4) is given by
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By setting t=T, note that
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This expression is consistent with M-Y 2003 equation (16), where the authors note
that without a consumption floor,
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However, with a consumption floor the derivative has another additive term,
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Appendix C: An approximate solution to the pre-annuitization problem
First-order condition
Appendix D: Optimal T when subjective and objective hazard rates diverge
Milevsky and Young (2003) Appendix B presents a proof of the proposition that
annuitization is delayed when subjective and objective assessments of the force of
mortality are different, but obey ~+ r < 2 a~+r- In the case where an individual views
themselves as less likely to survive, this condition is always met because ~+r <
a~+T' but the proof also holds for individuals who regard themselves as more likely
to survive, as long as ~+r < 2a~+r' (Numerical examples give more general support
for the result.) In the case of HARA utility the divergence result still holds. The
following adapts the M- Y proof to the HARA case.
The optimal moment of annuitization occurs when
Assume for simplicity that a =s. Consider the value function
- - _ [r -r(s-I) (c,-crr w-r - -] (C I)V(W,t)= sup E, Je s-tPx+, 1 y ds+k(t,T)r=y IW,=W .
csons,T t
h k( T) - -r(T-t) -ywere t, = e r-rPx+rax+T"
Expected net gain from committing to annuitize at date T, with the decision being
taken at date t is zero if and only if




First order condition with respect to T is proportional to:
~-YIEI d T commit at , to
annuitize at T
[
--y - Y--(I+Y)( - )2]ex EI WT dWr-"2 Wr dWr
{
- -Y Y - -(I+y) 2 2 }=E1 Wr [TIr(a-r)dt+oTIrdz- WTAx+TdtJ -"2 Wr 0 TITdt .
Setting this expression equal to zero gives
(C.3)
Substitute for optimized TIr to get
Define the subjective annuity factor in terms of the objective annuity factor as
Collect terms
(0.2)
-E {_o.l-Y [(a-r)2 I (a-r)2] d W--yw' d _o.l-y(a-r) d }
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(C.5)
for small e of either sign, and rewrite (0.1)
run the expectations operator through
I (a-r)2 (_O.l-Y) --Y - A
= - --2-E1 wT dt-E1[WT (Wr+ Wr)]Ax+Tdt+O2 yo
(C.6) (0.3)
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which will be zero when
(e.7) By expanding the second term around zero, this expression reduces to
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In the limiting case t = T, this reduces to equation (24) of the main text. for -1 <-=1-< 1.
a.~+T
248 G. Kingston and S. Thorp
Milevsky and Young state that by choosing a value 0 < e* < ii'E , the mean value
.1'+T
theorem gives
"=" [0 ( WT) ] (e*)2O=(ax+T +e) O-Ax+T 1+ WT -r +2Y
[
0 ( WT) ] (e*)2 1
=o-Ax+T1+----r+-2- ( ).
WT Y rio 1+_e_
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(D.S)
Since -1 < ii'E < 1, the second term is always positive. The condition for optimal
x+T
annuitization is
(e*)2 I ° ( WT)0-r+-2- ( ) =Ax+T 1+-_- .Y s: 1+_e_ WT
x+T ri~+T
So we can infer that differences between hazard rates still delay annuitization in the
region -1 <i/-< 1, or equivalently, ~+T <2ri~+T'
x+T
